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Abstract—In this paper, we study the interactions among in-
terconnected autonomous microgrids, and propose a joint energy
trading and scheduling strategy. Each interconnected microgrid
not only schedules its local power supply and demand, but also
trades energy with other microgrids in a distribution network.
Specifically, microgrids with excessive renewable generations
can trade with other microgrids in deficit of power supplies
for mutual benefits. Since interconnected microgrids operate
autonomously, they aim to optimize their own performance and
expect to gain benefits through energy trading. We design an
incentive mechanism using Nash bargaining theory to encourage
proactive energy trading and fair benefit sharing. We solve
the bargaining problem by decomposing it into two sequential
problems on social cost minimization and trading benefit sharing,
respectively. For practical implementation, we propose a decen-
tralized solution method with minimum information exchange
overhead. Numerical studies based on realistic data demonstrate
that the total cost of the interconnected-microgrids operation
can be reduced by up to 13.2% through energy trading, and
an individual participating microgrid can achieve up to 29.4%
reduction in its cost through energy trading.
Index Terms—Microgrid, renewable energy, energy storage,
demand response, energy trading, Nash bargaining solution
(NBS), alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM),
distributed algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional power systems often generate power in large
power stations using fossil fuel resources, and distribute it over
long distances. This results in quick depletion of fossil fuel
resources, increased environmental pollution, and potentially
significant energy losses during transmission and distribution.
This motivates the study and adoption of microgrids [2], [3],
which are small-scale power supply networks with distributed
generations and demands. A microgrid consists of an inter-
connected network of several energy sources (including both
conventional and renewable energy generators), and serves
the local electrical loads from residential, commercial, and
industrial consumers. In comparison with centralized and
conventional models of power system, the microgrid brings
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several benefits: reducing power transmission loss, enhancing
the system resilience, and integrating distributed generations
especially from renewable sources. Wide deployment and
proper management of microgrids can have significant positive
impact on the overall power grid system.
Several recent representative studies on the interactions
among multiple microgrids include [4]–[7] and the references
therein. However, the studies in [4]–[7] either assumed that all
the microgrids are coordinated by a common grid operator,
or focused on the interaction between the main grid and
microgrids in a hierarchical structure. Although these scenarios
are practically important, it is equally important to consider the
scenario that involves multiple small autonomous microgrids
operating in an distributed fashion, which is considered as
an important feature of the next generation smart grid [2],
[3]. These interconnected microgrids can exchange energy and
information with each other, and are operated by independent
microgrid operators instead of a common coordinator. This
essentially leads to an (small scale) energy market of inter-
connected microgrids. Thus, it is important to design a new
operation framework for this new decentralized paradigm.
To design a new distributed optimization operation frame-
work for interconnected microgrids, we need to tackle the fol-
lowing two challenges: incentive issues and decision coupling.
First, autonomous microgrids are independent entities with
self-interests, and they will only interact with other microgrids
if such interactions lead to additional benefits. Hence it is
essential to design incentive mechanisms that encourage such
interactions. Second, each microgrid has two different types of
operating decisions: external strategy on how to interact with
other microgrids and internal strategy on how to coordinate
local power supply and demand. These two types of operating
decisions are coupled, e.g., selling energy to other microgrids
will reduce the energy supply that can be used to satisfy local
needs. Similarly, the decisions of different microgrids are also
tightly coupled together, as the total supply and demand in the
market depend on every microgrid’s decision.
In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism using
Nash bargaining solution, to encourage proactive interactions
and fair benefit sharing among interconnected microgrids. All
the interconnected microgrids jointly optimize their energy
trading and scheduling, by taking the advantages of diverse
supply and demand patterns in different microgrids. The key
idea is to exploit the fact that supply and demand profiles
in different microgrids exhibit both time and location diversi-
ties. Due to the time-varying and location-dependent nature
of renewable energy generations, one microgrid may have
excess local renewable generation at the same time when
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2another microgrid is deficient in power supply from its local
generation. In addition, users’ power consumption profiles in
different microgrids can also be significantly different, because
of various types of consumers. Measurement data show that
the residential users consume more power in the night, while
the commercial power usage reaches peak during day time [8].
The diversified renewable outputs and demand profiles provide
ample opportunities for interconnected microgrids to exchange
electricity with each other to enhance their operational perfor-
mance and reduce operating cost.
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows.
• Joint scheduling and trading: We develop a holistic model
for the microgrids-system to jointly optimize power
scheduling within individual microgrids and energy trad-
ing among interconnected microgrids.
• Incentive mechanism design: We propose a bargaining-
based incentive mechanism for energy trading among in-
terconnected microgrids, which can leverage their diverse
supply/demand profiles and bring mutual benefits.
• Problem decomposition and distributed solution: We de-
compose the bargaining problem into two sequential sub-
problems to solve the optimal energy schedules and trad-
ing payments, respectively. We also design a distributed
solution method with limited information exchange over-
head that is suitable for the practical implementation.
• Numerical simulations and implications: Numerical stud-
ies based on realistic data demonstrate the effectiveness
of the energy trading solution, with a total cost reduction
of 13.2% for the interconnected-microgrids system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
review the related work in Section II. In Section III, we
formulate the joint energy trading and scheduling of intercon-
nected microgrids as a Nash bargaining problem. We present
theoretical analysis of the problem and propose a decentralized
solution method in Section IV and V, respectively. Numerical
results are presented in Section VI. Finally, we conclude this
paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Operation of the multiple-microgrids system has attracted
extensive research in [4]–[7]. Fathi and Bevrani studied coop-
erative power dispatching of multiple interconnected micro-
grids in [4], and considered the impact of demand uncertainty
in [5]. The studies in [4], [5] all assumed that the microgrids
are coordinated by a common operator. This may not always
be the case in practice, where microgrids can be self-managed
and independent entities. Asimakopoulou et al. [6] proposed
a leader-follower energy management strategy to study the
interactions between an energy producer and energy service
providers. Wang et al. [7] studied the interactions between a
distribution network operator and clusters of microgrids. The
studies in [6], [7] have mainly focused on the interactions
between the main grid and microgrids under a hierarchical
structure.
Several other studies explored direct interactions among
interconnected microgrids [9], [10]. Matamoros et al. [9]
studied energy trading between two islanding microgrids. Gre-
goratti and Matamoros [10] explored energy exchange among
multiple microgrids, and formulated a convex optimization
problem to minimize the global cost. However, studies in
[9] and [10] did not consider the self-interests of multiple
microgrids. Recent work [11]–[14] studied the energy trading
and management problems of microgrids using game-theoretic
approaches. For example, Zhang et al. in [11] proposed a
randomized auction framework for microgrids to participate
in the electricity market. Wang et al. in [12] proposed a
double-auction market for distributed storage units to trade
energy in the smart grid. Nunna et al. proposed the agent-
based energy management methods to facilitate energy trading
among microgrids with demand response in [13] and with
distributed storage in [14]. In this paper, we aim to study
the energy trading among multiple interconnected microgrids,
considering the self-interest and diverse generation and load
profiles of each microgrid. We formulate a holistic model
for the interconnected-microgrids system and jointly optimize
both their internal power scheduling and external energy
trading. We design an incentive mechanism to encourage
proactive energy trading among interconnected microgrids,
such that each participating microgrid can benefit from the
trading. We propose a two-step solution method, and design
a distributed algorithm to solve energy trading and payment.
Finally, we validate the performance of our proposed method
using realistic data.
III. INTERCONNECTED-MICROGRIDS SYSTEM
We consider a network of M interconnected microgrids
M = {1, ...,M}. These microgrids are connected to the
main power grid1, and are also interconnected with each
other. These interconnected microgrids can exchange power
and information with each other through a power bus and
a communication network. Fig. 1 illustrates such a system
model. Each microgrid i ∈M contains the following compo-
nents: local renewable generation, energy storage, and demand
responsive users. We consider an operation horizon of one day,
which is divided into T = 24 equal time slots, denoted as
T = {1, ..., T}. We assume that microgrids can schedule their
power supplies and flexible loads based on the prediction of
daily renewable energy profiles, and any mismatch caused by
the prediction errors can be balanced in the real-time market.
In this paper, we focus on the energy trading and scheduling
in a day-ahead market. The microgrid operator is responsible
for the power scheduling in the microgrid as well as its energy
trading with other interconnected microgrids at the beginning
of each day.
As power scheduling and energy trading are highly coupled
across microgrids, we aim at the joint optimization of all the
interconnected microgrids in a distributed fashion. Before pre-
senting the interconnected energy trading model, we formulate
the power scheduling problem within each microgrid.
1Microgrid can work either in the island mode or in the connected mode. In
the island mode, the microgrid is isolated from the main grid, and only relies
on its local generation as the supply. In the connected mode, the microgrid is
connected to the main grid, and can purchase power from the main grid. We
assume that the microgrid works in the connected mode in this paper.
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Fig. 1: A system with interconnected microgrids.
A. Power Scheduling in Each Microgrid
Power supply in microgrid i can be categorized into local
renewable power generation and power from the main grid.
1) Local renewable power generation: There are various
types of renewable energy technologies, such as wind, pho-
tovoltaic, biomass, and tidal systems. We will focus on the
renewable power generation from the wind source as a con-
crete example in this paper,2 as our later numerical evaluations
will be based on the wind speed data obtained from the Hong
Kong Observatory [15].
Based on the hourly wind speed data [15], we use a
wind power model [16] to calculate the corresponding wind
power generation ηi = {ηti , ∀t ∈ T } in microgrid i per
kW capacity. We assume that microgrid i has installed wind
turbine generators with total generation capacity Gi (kW ),
and have the following constraint for the wind power supply
gi = {gti , ∀t ∈ T }:
0 ≤ gti ≤ ηtiGi, ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈M, (1)
where ηtiGi denotes the maximum available wind power of
microgrid i in time slot t. Note that the local wind power usage
gti of microgrid i in time slot t can be less but no greater than
the available wind power ηtiGi, because the microgrid operator
can either curtail excess wind power generation or sell excess
generation back to the main grid.
Different from conventional power generations, wind power
generation does not consume fuel sources, so for simplicity we
assume a zero marginal generation cost [17].
2) Main grid power: When the local wind power generation
is not adequate to meet the demand, microgrid i can also
purchase power from the main power grid. Let qtb,i denote
the power bought from the main grid by microgrid i in time
slot t, and define qb,i = {qtb,i, ∀t ∈ T }. The purchased power
qb,i is subject to the following constraint:
0 ≤ qtb,i ≤ Qmaxb,i , ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈M, (2)
2Our theoretic model and analysis are applicable to other renewable sources.
where Qmaxb,i denotes the maximum amount of power that
microgrid i can purchase from the main grid, due to physical
capacity limit.
When the microgrid has excess local wind power gen-
eration, it can sell power back to the main grid under a
feed-in tariff contract [18]. Let qts,i denote the power sold
to the main grid by microgrid i in time slot t, and define
qs,i = {qts,i, ∀t ∈ T }. The power sold to the main grid qs,i
satisfies the following constraint:
0 ≤ qts,i ≤ Qmaxs,i , ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈M, (3)
where Qmaxs,i denotes the maximum allowed amount of power
that microgrid i can sell to the main grid.
Energy cost is associated with the main grid power sched-
ules and prices. We denote ptb as the power procurement
(buying) price and denote pts as the power feed-in (selling)
price3 set by the main grid in time slot t. For notational
simplicity, we let qi = {qb,i, qs,i} denote the main grid power
schedule of microgrid i over T time slots. The energy cost of
microgrid i is written as
Ci(qi) =
∑
t∈T
(
ptbq
t
b,i − ptsqts,i
)
, ∀i ∈M. (4)
3) Local power demand: Let Ni denote the set of users in
microgrid i ∈ M. We classify the loads of each user n ∈ Ni
into two categories: inelastic loads and elastic loads.
The inelastic loads, such as refrigerator and illumination
demands, cannot be easily shifted over time. We let bti denote
the aggregate inelastic load of all the users in microgrid i and
time slot t, and denote bi = {bti, ∀t ∈ T }. The elastic loads,
such as electric vehicle, HVAC (heating, ventilation and air
conditioning) and washer demands, can be flexibly scheduled
over time. For user n ∈ Ni in microgrid i, the elastic load is
denoted as xn = {xtn, ∀t ∈ T }, where xtn is user n’s elastic
power consumption in time slot t.
The demand response program can only control the elastic
loads, and should be subject to the following constraints:∑
t∈T
xtn = Dn, ∀n ∈ Ni, ∀i ∈M, (5)
dt,minn ≤ xtn ≤ dt,maxn , ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ Ni, ∀i ∈M, (6)
where constraint (5) corresponds to the prescribed total energy
requirement Dn in the entire operation horizon. Constraint (6)
provides a lower bound dt,minn and upper bound d
t,max
n for the
power consumption of user n in each time slot t.
Elastic power consumption of user n can be scheduled
across time as long as the power consumption satisfies the
constraints (5) and (6). However, scheduling power load may
affect user’s comfort. Let yn = {ytn, ∀t ∈ T } denote the
most preferred power consumption of user n. When the actual
power consumption xn deviates from the preferred power
consumption yn, user n will experience discomfort. Similar
as the discomfort measure in [19], we define the discomfort
cost of user n as
Cn(xn) = βn
∑
t∈T
(
xtn − ytn
)2
, (7)
3We assume that all the microgrids are connected to the same main grid,
and the power buying/selling prices for all the microgrids are the same.
4where (xtn − ytn)2 measures how much the actual power
consumption differs from the preferred power consumption.
Weighted coefficient βn is used to indicate the sensitivity of
user n towards the power consumption deviation.
4) Local energy storage: Energy storage (such as batteries)
can smooth out the intermittent wind power generation, flatten
the power load by charging when the load is low and discharg-
ing during peak load times, and exploit time-varying electricity
prices for arbitrage. We assume that microgrid i has installed
energy storage devices with a total capacity Smaxi , and let s
t
i,
rtc,i, and r
t
d,i denote the amount of electricity stored, charged,
and discharged in time slot t, respectively.
First, the charging and discharging power in each time slot
t are bounded, and satisfy the following constraints:
0 ≤ rtc,i ≤ rmaxc,i , ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈M, (8)
0 ≤ rtd,i ≤ rmaxd,i , ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈M, (9)
where rmaxc,i and r
max
d,i denote the maximum charging and
discharging rates of energy storage in microgrid i, respectively.
Second, there are power losses when electricity is charged
into and discharged from the battery. We denote ηc,i ∈ (0, 1]
and ηd,i ∈ (0, 1] as the conversion efficiencies of charging and
discharging. Therefore, we obtain the energy storage dynamics
of microgrid i in time slot t as
sti = s
t−1
i + ηc,ir
t
c,i −
rtd,i
ηd,i
, ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈M. (10)
Third, repeated charging and discharging cause degradation
of the energy storage devices. The life-time of energy storage
is usually characterized by the number of charging/discharging
cycles under a given depth of discharge (DoD) [20], which
is defined as the maximum discharge to the capacity. The
storage can sustain more charging/discharging cycles with
smaller DoD. We denote DoDi as the DoD requirement for
energy storage operation in microgrid i, and have the following
constraint for the energy level:
(1−DoDi)Smaxi ≤ sti ≤ Smaxi , ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈M, (11)
where Smaxi and (1−DoDi)Smaxi are upper and lower bounds
for the level of stored energy in microgrid i, respectively.
Specifically, the stored energy should be no greater than the
physical capacity Smaxi , and no less than the operational
requirement (1 − DoDi)Smaxi . We also restrict the terminal
energy level sTi to be the same as its initial level s
0
i , such that
the daily storage operation is decoupled across different days.
Last, to incorporate the degradation of energy storage
caused by charging and discharging, we introduce cs as the
amortized cost of charging and discharging over the lifetime,
and model the cost of energy storage operation [21] as
Cs(rc,i, rd,i) = cs
(∑
t∈T
rtc,i +
∑
t∈T
rtd,i
)
, (12)
where rc,i = {rtc,i, ∀t ∈ T } and rd,i = {rtd,i, ∀t ∈ T }
denote the charging and discharging amount over the operation
horizon T in microgrid i, respectively.
B. Single Microgrid’s Cost Minimization Problem
In each microgrid, its operator coordinates the power
scheduling, energy storage charging, discharging, and elastic
load shifting. First of all, the microgrid operator should keep
the power supply and demand balanced, i.e.,
gti + q
t
b,i + r
t
d,i = q
t
s,i + r
t
c,i + b
t
i +
∑
n∈Ni
xtn, ∀t ∈ T ,∀i ∈M,
(13)
where the left-hand side represents the total power supply in
time slot t, including wind power generation gti , power drawn
from the main grid qtb,i, and power discharged from the battery
rtd,i. The right-hand side represents the total power demand in
time slot t, including power sold to the main grid qts,i, power
charged into the battery rtc,i, aggregate inelastic load b
t
i and
aggregate elastic load of all the users
∑
n∈Ni x
t
n.
Moreover, the power sold to the main grid qts,i cannot be
greater than the total available power of microgrid i, i.e.,
qts,i ≤ ηtiGi − gti + sti, ∀t ∈ T ,∀i ∈M, (14)
where the total available power in time slot t consists of the
local wind power surplus ηtiGi − gti and the battery energy
level sti.
We assume that the microgrid operator owns both renew-
able energy generators and energy storage facilities, and can
schedule the elastic loads through demand response programs.
The objective of each microgrid operator is to minimize its
total operating cost, including the energy cost, energy storage
operation cost, and users’ discomfort costs. For simplicity, we
denote the operating cost of microgrid i as
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i)
,Ci(qi) +
∑
n∈Ni
Cn(xn) + Cs(rc,i, rd,i).
Therefore, we formulate the microgrid operator’s operating
cost minimization problem as follows
Cost minimization problem for Microgrid i (P-MGi)
min COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i)
subject to (1)–(3), (5), (6), (8)–(11), (13), and (14)
variables: gi, qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i.
We can verify that Problem P-MGi is convex, and can be
efficiently solved by several standard optimization techniques
[22]. We let CNoni denote the optimal value of the objective
function in Problem P-MGi, which indicates the minimum
cost that microgrid i can achieve without trading energy
with other microgrids. It also serves as the noncooperative
benchmark for comparison in Section IV.
C. Energy Trading among Microgrids
Now we consider the possibility of energy trading among
interconnected microgrids. Microgrids at different locations
have different renewable power generations and local load pro-
files. Through trading energy with each other, interconnected
microgrids can exploit the diversities of supply and demand
5patterns, and achieve mutual benefits. Next we will study the
energy trading interactions among interconnected microgrids
based on the Nash bargaining solution [23].
A Nash bargaining problem solves a fair Pareto optimal
solution and leads to a bargaining solution, which fulfills the
following axioms [23].
1) Individual Rationality: All players should improve their
utilities through the bargaining compared with their
performances without cooperation (namely disagreement
points); otherwise, they would not cooperate.
2) Feasibility: For the bargaining game, there exists at least
one feasible solution that satisfies all the constraints.
3) Pareto Optimality: A player cannot find another solution,
in which every player receives a utility no smaller than
the one received in the Nash bargaining game, and some
player receives a payoff that is strictly higher than the
one received in the Nash bargaining game.
4) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If the bargain-
ing solution is found on a smaller domain of the feasible
set, then the solution is not affected by expanding the
smaller domain within the feasible set.
5) Independence of Linear Transformations: The bargain-
ing solution is invariant if the utility function and
disagreement point are scaled by a linear transformation.
6) Symmetry: If players have the same disagreement points
and utility functions, they will have the same utility at
the bargaining solution regardless of their indices.
Axioms 1), 2), and 3) define the bargaining set, and axioms
4), 5), and 6) ensure the fairness of the bargaining solution.
We consider that each microgrid i ∈ M bargains with all
the other interconnected microgrids to determine the amount
of energy trading ei = {eti,j , ∀t ∈ T , ∀j ∈ M\i} and
the associated payment pii = {pii,j , ∀j ∈ M\i}. Here eti,j
denotes the amount of energy that microgrid i exchanges with
microgrid j in time slot t, and pii,j denotes the associated
payment for energy trading between microgrid i and microgrid
j. If microgrid i purchases energy from microgrid j in time
slot t, then eti,j > 0; otherwise, microgrid i sells energy to
microgrid j and eti,j < 0. Similarly, if microgrid i makes
payment to microgrid j, then pii,j > 0; otherwise microgrid i
receives payment from microgrid j and pii,j < 0.4
The energy trading and payment among microgrids should
satisfy the market clearing constraints:
eti,j + e
t
j,i = 0, ∀t ∈ T , ∀j ∈M\i, ∀i ∈M, (15)
pii,j + pij,i = 0, ∀j ∈M\i, ∀i ∈M. (16)
We assume that the microgrids are located close to each
other, such that the loss of energy exchange is negligible. The
new power balance constraint for each microgrid is written as
gti + q
t
b,i + r
t
d,i +
∑
j∈M\i
eti,j = q
t
s,i + r
t
c,i + b
t
i +
∑
n∈Ni
xtn,
∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈M,
(17)
4Note that the payments pii are determined through bargaining between
microgrids, and are not necessary linear in terms of the energy exchange ei.
where
∑
j∈M\i e
t
i,j is the net energy traded between microgrid
i and all other microgrids in time slot t. If
∑
j∈M\i e
t
i,j > 0,
microgrid i purchases energy from other microgrids to serve
its local demand; otherwise,
∑
j∈M\i e
t
i,j < 0, microgrid i
sells energy to make profit.
Though the interconnected microgrids cooperate and trade
energy with each other, they are still independent and selfish
players. Each microgrid is a self-interested rational decision
maker, it aims to optimize its own performance in terms of
minimizing its total cost through energy trading. Compared
with the cost function of microgrid i in Problem P-MGi, the
interconnected microgrid has an extra cost that is the payment
to other microgrids, i.e.,
Ce(pii) =
∑
j∈M\i
pii,j .
The overall cost of microgrid i consists of both operating
cost COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i) and trading payment Ce(pii). It is
clear that a microgrid will only participate in the trading if it
can reduce its overall cost. This means that some microgrid
may choose not participate in the trading. Thus, we have the
following constraint:
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i) + Ce(pii) ≤ CNoni , ∀i ∈M. (18)
Here the left-hand side of the inequality counts the overall
cost of microgrid i when participating in the energy trading.
In the right-hand side, CNoni denotes the minimized cost that
microgrid i can achieve without trading energy with other
microgrids. In the bargaining literature we also call CNoni the
disagreement point.
D. Nash Bargaining Formulation for Energy Trading
We let M′ ⊆ M denote the set of microgrids who are
willing to trade energy with each other. For the microgrids
j ∈ M\M′, they cannot benefit from energy trading and
thus have no incentive to participate in the energy trading.
Therefore, we focus on the microgrids in set M′, and
formulate their energy trading as a Nash bargaining problem:
Nash bargaining problem for energy trading (NBP)
max
∏
i∈M′
[
CNoni −
(
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i) + Ce(pii)
)]
subject to (1)–(3), (5), (6), (8)–(11), and (14)–(18),
variables: {gi, qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i, ei,pii, i ∈M′},
where CNoni −
(
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i) + Ce(pii)
)
corresponds
to the cost reduction of microgrid i, i.e., the differ-
ence between disagreement point CNoni and the total cost
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i) + Ce(pii) of microgrid i through bar-
gaining. Compared with the summation of performance im-
provement of microgrids, the Nash product can guarantee that
the benefits of cooperation are shared by each microgrid in a
fair manner.
Solving Problem NBP yields the optimal strategy of energy
trading and payment, as well as the optimal power scheduling
in each microgrid i ∈ M′. However, we do not know the
subset M′ before hand. Moreover, to solve Problem NBP
6centrally, we need complete information of the interconnected-
microgrids system, including all the operational parameters of
each microgrid. This, however, may not be feasible in practice.
To address the above two issues, we will analyze the
Problem NBP to identify the microgrids with willingness to
trade energy in Section IV, and design a decentralized solution
method for the practical implementation in Section V.
IV. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
In this Section, we will analyze the Nash bargaining prob-
lem NBP and explore the connection between the bargaining
solution and the social optimal solution of the interconnected-
microgrids system. Based on the connection, we then decom-
pose NBP into two consecutive problems on energy trading
& scheduling and trading payment, respectively.
We first assume that we know the subset M′,5 and focus
on the microgrids in set M′. Each microgrid i ∈ M′ is
willing to participate in the energy trading market and can
strictly improve its performance in terms of lowering its total
cost i.e., COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i) + Ce(pii) < C
Non
i . Take this
group of microgrids as the new system, and the total cost
for the system will be reduced due to energy trading, i.e.,∑
i∈M′
[
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i) + Ce(pii)
]
<
∑
i∈M′ C
Non
i .
But there remains a question: what is the optimal total cost
for the microgrids-system? We have the following observation
presented in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For the microgrids in set M′, the optimal
energy trading & scheduling solution to Problem NBP also
minimizes the total cost of this group of microgrids i ∈M′.
Proposition 1 shows that the cooperation among microgrids
achieves the best performance for the system. The intuition is
as follows. The microgrids can be better off if the overall
performance of the system improves, as they are able to
gain benefits from the performance improvement (as cost
reduction) of the overall system through proper money transfer
(payments). Therefore, all the microgrids will cooperate to
maximize the total benefit of the system, which explains why
the minimum total cost can be achieved. For microgrids in
set M\M′, they do not have incentives to trade energy,6 and
thus each such microgrid i achieves the same performance
of CNoni as in Section III.B, when they operate separately
from other microgrids. Therefore, only those microgrids in
set M′ that trade energy with others contribute to the total
cost reduction of the system. Next, we present a systematic
method to determine which microgrids do not trade energy in
the system.
By Proposition 1, we can decompose the original Nash
bargaining problem NBP into two sequential subproblems, as
presented in Theorem 1.
5We will later discuss how to determine the subsetM′ in Theorem 1.
6There are several scenarios where some microgrids do not have incentives
to participate in the energy trading market. For example, when the microgrid
perfectly balance its local demand and generation, there is no need to purchase
energy from outside or no excessive supply to sell. Another possible scenario
is that all the microgrids have excessive renewable energy generation than
their demands, hence trading does not happen.
Theorem 1. The energy-trading bargaining problem NBP can
be decomposed into two sequential subproblems on energy
trading & scheduling and trading payment, denoted as P1
and P2, respectively. In the first step, we solve a social op-
erating cost minimization problem P1 for the interconnected-
microgrids system, which yields the optimal energy scheduling
and energy trading for all microgrids. Those microgrids that
trade energy with other microgrids form the set M′. In the
second step, microgrids in set M′ bargain with each other to
determine the energy-trading payments in P2.
P1: Social operating cost minimization problem
min
∑
i∈M
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i)
subject to (1)–(3), (5), (6), (8)–(11), (14), (15), and (17),
variables: {gi, qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i, ei, i ∈M}.
Solving P1 determines the optimal energy trading &
scheduling {g∗i , q∗i ,x∗n, r∗c,i, r∗d,i, e∗i } for each microgrid i ∈
M. If a microgrid i has a nonzero energy trading vector ei,
then it belongs to set M′, and will participate in the payment
bargaining in Problem P2. For the non-trading microgrids
j ∈M\M′, they do not participate in the payment bargaining
and their operating costs are the same as the disagreement
points CNonj .
P2: Payment bargaining problem
max
∏
i∈M′
(
δ∗i − Ce(pii)
)
subject to (16) and (18),
variables: {pii, i ∈M′},
where δ∗i , CNoni −COi (q∗i ,x∗n, r∗c,i, r∗d,i) denotes the operat-
ing cost reduction of microgrid i based on the optimal solution
of Problem P1.
Theorem 1 decomposes the bargaining problem NBP into
two subproblems, which can be solved sequentially. Firstly, the
interconnected microgrids cooperate together to trade energy
and minimize the social operating cost of the entire system.
Any microgrid trading energy with others contributes to the
social cost reduction of the entire multi-microgrid system.
These microgrids can benefit from energy trading through
sharing the reduced social cost via the bargaining, and hence
have incentives to participate in the trading. Specifically,
microgrids selling energy to others can receive payments
through bargaining, and microgrids buying energy from others
can reduce their operational costs (though they need to pay
for energy purchase). Solving Problem P1 involves all the
microgrids and does not exclude any of microgrids in the
system. In the optimal solution of Problem P1, if there
exist any microgrids who do not trade with others, these
non-trading microgrids do not contribute to the social cost
minimization and won’t benefit from energy trading. The only
criterion for determining trading and non-trading microgrids
is whether they can contribute to the social cost minimization.
Secondly, after identifying those microgrids who do not want
to participate in the energy trading, we then focus on the rest
of the microgrids who trade energy. We decide a fair allocation
7of benefits to each of participated microgrids through the
payment bargaining problem P2.
Problem P1 and P2 are both convex, and can be solved
efficiently in a centralized optimization manner. However,
this may not be feasible in practice, as each microgrid is
an independent decision maker, and the smart grid operator
may not directly control each microgrid’s energy trading and
scheduling. Moreover, each microgrid has two categories of
decision variables: power schedules {gi, qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i} as
internal variables, and energy trading & payment {ei,pii} as
external variables. Centralized optimization is not practical,
because it may violate the privacy of microgrid’s internal
operation. We will discuss the design of a decentralized
algorithm to solve P1 and P2 in the next section.
For the proofs of Theorems, please refer to the appendix.
V. DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION METHOD
In this section, we design a decentralized solution method,
which enables the microgrids to coordinate with each other to
solve P1 and P2. We use the alternating direction method of
multipliers (ADMM) [24] to design the distributed algorithm,
as ADMM has good convergence properties for the optimiza-
tion problems with non-strictly convex objective functions and
large-scale variables.
A. Solving P1 (Social Cost Minimization)
First, we solve P1 in a decentralized fashion. Since the
convergence of the multi-block ADMM algorithm cannot be
guaranteed, we introduce auxiliary variables for the energy
trading decisions in order to convert the M -block (correspond-
ing to M -microgrid) structure of the original optimization
problem into an equivalent two-block structure. The conver-
gence of ADMM algorithm with two blocks of variables
is guaranteed [24]. Specifically, let us introduce auxiliary
variables eˆi = {eˆti,j ,∀j ∈ M\i,∀t ∈ T }, and replace
constraints (15) by
eˆti,j = e
t
i,j , ∀t ∈ T , ∀j ∈M\i, ∀i ∈M, (19)
eˆti,j + eˆ
t
j,i = 0, ∀t ∈ T , ∀j ∈M\i, ∀i ∈M. (20)
We define λ = {λti,j} as the dual variables associated with
constraints (19), and have the augmented Lagrangian for P1:
L1(gi, qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i, ei, eˆi,λ)
=
∑
i∈M
[
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i)
+
∑
j∈M\i
∑
t∈T
(ρ1
2
(
eˆti,j − eti,j
)2
+ λti,j
(
eˆti,j − eti,j
)) ]
,
where ρ1 > 0 is a parameter for the quadratic penalty of
constraint (19).
The ADMM solution method involves iterations between a
lower level problem and a higher level problem. Specifically,
the lower level problem involves microgrids solving their local
optimization problems in parallel based on fixed dual variables
λ and auxiliary variables eˆ. The upper level problem involves
updating the auxiliary variables and dual variables using the
results from the low level problems.
In iteration k, given parameter ρ1(k), dual variables λti,j(k)
and auxiliary variables eˆti,j(k), each microgrid i solves its local
optimization problem:
Local optimization problem of P1 (P1-MGi)
min COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i)
+
∑
j∈M\i
∑
t∈T
(ρ1
2
(
eˆti,j(k)− eti,j
)2 − λti,j(k)eti,j)
subject to (1)–(3), (5), (6), (8)–(11), (14), and (17),
variables: gi, qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i, ei.
Based on the solution ei(k+1) from Problem P1-MGi, the
higher level problem updates auxiliary variables eˆi and dual
variables λ. Specifically, the higher level problem of P1 is
formulated as follows:
min
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈M\i
∑
t∈T
(ρ1
2
(
eˆti,j − eti,j(k + 1)
)2
+ λti,j(k)eˆ
t
i,j
)
subject to (20),
variables: {eˆi, i ∈M}.
As the auxiliary variables are only coupled between each
pair of trading partners, we can solve the higher level problem
of P1 by considering the following optimization problem only
involving a pair of microgrids i and j,
min
ρ1
2
(
eˆti,j − eti,j(k + 1)
)2
+ λti,j(k)eˆ
t
i,j
+
ρ1
2
(
eˆtj,i − etj,i(k + 1)
)2
+ λtj,i(k)eˆ
t
j,i
subject to eˆti,j + eˆ
t
j,i = 0,
variables: {eˆti,j , eˆtj,i},
and obtain the optimal closed-form solution for updating eˆti,j :
eˆti,j(k + 1) = −eˆtj,i(k + 1)
=
ρ1
(
eti,j(k + 1)− etj,i(k + 1)
)− (λti,j(k)− λtj,i(k))
2ρ1
.
(21)
Based on eti,j(k + 1) and eˆ
t
i,j(k + 1), we update the dual
variables as follows:
λti,j(k + 1) = λ
t
i,j(k) + ρ1
(
eˆti,j(k + 1)− eti,j(k + 1)
)
.
(22)
B. Solving P2 (Payment Bargaining)
Second, we solve P2 in a decentralized fashion. We intro-
duce auxiliary variables pˆii = {pˆii,j ,∀j ∈ M\i}, and replace
constraints (16) by
pˆii,j = pii,j , ∀j ∈M\i, ∀i ∈M, (23)
pˆii,j + pˆij,i = 0, ∀j ∈M\i, ∀i ∈M. (24)
We take the log transformation of the objective function of
the bargaining problem P2, and write the Lagrangian for P2:
L2(pii, pˆii,γ) =
∑
i∈M
[
− ln
(
δ∗i − Ce(pii)
)
+
∑
j∈M\i
(ρ2
2
(pˆii,j − pii,j)2 + γi,j (pˆii,j − pii,j)
) ]
,
8where γ = {γi,j} are dual variables associated with con-
straints (23), and ρ2 is a penalty parameter.
Similarly, solving Problem P2 involves iterations between
a lower problem and a higher problem. In iteration k, given
pˆii,j(k) and γi,j(k), each microgrid solves its local optimiza-
tion problem:
Local optimization problem of P2 (P2-MGi)
min − ln
(
δ∗i − Ce(pii)
)
+
∑
j∈M\i
(ρ2
2
(pˆii,j(k)− pii,j)2 − γi,j(k)pii,j
)
subject to (18),
variables: pii.
Based on the solution pii,j(k + 1) from Problem P2-MGi,
the higher level problem updates the auxiliary variables pˆii
and dual variable γ. Specifically, the higher level problem of
P2 is formulated as follows:
min
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈M\i
(ρ2
2
(pˆii,j − pii,j(k + 1))2 + γi,j(k)pˆii,j
)
subject to (24),
variables: {pˆii, i ∈M}.
We can solve the higher level problem of P2 by considering
a pair of microgrids i and j,
min
ρ2
2
(pˆii,j − pii,j(k + 1))2 + γi,j(k)pˆii,j
+
ρ2
2
(pˆij,i − pij,i(k + 1))2 + γj,i(k)pˆij,i
subject to pˆii,j + pˆij,i = 0,
variables: {pˆii,j , pˆij,i},
and obtain the optimal closed-form solution for updating pˆii,j :
pˆii,j(k + 1) = −pˆij,i(k + 1)
=
ρ2 (pii,j(k + 1)− pij,i(k + 1))− (γi,j(k)− γj,i(k))
2ρ2
.
(25)
Based on pii,j(k + 1) and pˆii,j(k + 1), we update the dual
variables as follows:
γi,j(k + 1) = γi,j(k) + ρ2 (pˆii,j(k + 1)− pii,j(k + 1)) .
(26)
C. Algorithm Design and Implementation
To implement the solution method for solving the energy
trading and payment problems P1 and P2, we design a
distributed algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 1. We see that
Algorithm 1 solves problems P1 and P2 through iterations
between higher level and lower level problems within Step 1
and Step 2, respectively. We introduce the concept of virtual
clearing house for solving the higher level problem. The
virtual clearing house is a communication and computing
module7, which provides clearing service of energy trading
7The virtual clearing house is a non-profit driven computing module. The
virtual clearing house can communicate with all participating microgrids
using smart grid communication technologies, e.g., cellular-based wide area
networks and power line communications. The virtual clearing house is able
to protect the privacy of all the microgrids.
and payment for all the microgrids. At the beginning of each
daily operation, the virtual clearing house updates the auxiliary
and dual variables according to (21), (22) and (25), (26), and
broadcasts to all participating microgrids when solving P1 and
P2, respectively. All the participating microgrids concurrently
solve P1-MGi and P2-MGi and report their energy trading
schedules and payments to the virtual clearing house.
We see that Algorithm 1 only requires limited information
exchange overhead among microgrids. Each microgrid only
needs to communicate with the clearing house instead of all the
remaining microgrids. Such communication can be supported
by many existing one-to-many communication technologies,
such as the LTE cellular technology. For the microgrids,
they only need to report their energy trading and payment
schedules, as it’s reasonable to let the counterpart microgrids
know the trading amount of energy and payment during each
iteration. As for the local power scheduling, demand response,
and energy storage charging/discharging, each microgrid will
compute its own optimal decision, without disclosing its
private information of internal operations to other microgrids.
Therefore, Algorithm 1 solves the energy trading problem
EP1 with minimum information without releasing microgrid’s
private power schedules.
Algorithm 1 Distributed algorithm solving P1 and P2
1: Step 1: solve Problem P1.
2: Initialization: iteration index k = 1, error tolerance 1 >
0, stepsize ρ1(0) = 1, and initial multipliers λ(0) = 0.
3: repeat
4: At k-th iteration,
5: Lower Level Problem: Microgrid i solves Problem
P1-MGi based on the current value of dual variables λ(k);
6: Higher Level Problem: The virtual clearing house
makes update according to (21) and (22).
7: Update iteration index k = k + 1;
8: until terminal condition is satisfied, i.e.,
∑
i∈M ‖ eˆi(k)−
ei(k) ‖≤ 1.
9: Step 2: solve Problem P2.
10: Initialization: iteration index k = 1, error tolerance 2 > 0,
stepsize ρ2(0) = 1, and initial multipliers γ(0) = 0.
11: repeat
12: At k-th iteration,
13: Lower Level Problem: Microgrid i solves Problem
P2-MGi based on the current value of dual variables γ(k);
14: Higher Level Problem: The virtual clearing house
makes updates according to the rules in (25) and (26).
15: Update iteration index k = k + 1;
16: until terminal condition is satisfied, i.e.,
∑
i∈M′ ‖ pˆii(k)−
pii(k) ‖≤ 2.
17: end
Based on [24], we demonstrate the convergence of Algo-
rithm 1 in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 converges to the optimal solution of
P1 in step 1 and the optimal solution of P2 in step 2, under
proper stepsizes of ρ1(k) and ρ2(k), e.g., ρ1(k) = 1/k → 0,
and ρ2(k) = 1/k → 0, as k →∞.
9We can divide the decision variables of Problem P1 into two
blocks: {gi, qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i, ei, i ∈ M} and {eˆi, i ∈ M}.
Similarly, we can divide the decision variables of Problem
P2 into two blocks: {pii, i ∈ M′} and {pˆii, i ∈ M′}.
Since P1 and P2 are convex problems and Algorithm 1 is
a standard two-block ADMM algorithm, we conclude that the
convergence of Algorithm 1 is guaranteed [24].
VI. SIMULATION EVALUATIONS
We consider three interconnected microgrids, each having
its local wind generation. Based on the hourly wind speed data
[15] at several different Hong Kong locations, we calculate
the daily realizations of hourly wind power, and use wind
power productions on January 18, 2013 at Tate’s Cairn, Tai
Po Kau, and Sai Kung of Hong Kong as local renewable
generations in the three microgrids, respectively. Fig. 2 depicts
the wind power generations in microgrids 1, 2 and 3. The
electricity price of the main power grid is retrieved from
ISO New England [25] and is depicted in Fig. 3, and the
feed-in rate is set as 0.1. Other parameters are summarized
as follows: G1 = 600, G2 = G3 = 1000, Qmax1 = 500,
Qmax2 = Q
max
2 = 300, β1 = 1.0, β1 = β2 = 0.5,
rmaxc,1 = r
max
d,1 = 30, r
max
c,2 = r
max
d,2 = 40, r
max
c,3 = r
max
d,3 = 50,
Smax1 = 100, S
max
2 = S
max
3 = 200, cs = 0.01, and
ηc,i = ηd,i = 0.95, i = 1, 2, 3.
A. Optimal Energy Trading
We first study the optimal energy trading of all three micro-
grids, as depicted in Fig. 4. Here positive values correspond to
purchasing energy, and negative values correspond to selling
energy. We see that all three microgrids exchange energy
actively across the 24-hour operation horizon. From Fig. 2, we
see that microgrid 1 has higher wind power output than other
microgrids, and thus sell excessive energy to other microgrids
during most of time slots except hour 7. The reason for this is
that microgrid 1 has a sudden drop of wind power supply in
hour 7, while microgrid 3 has adequate generation in the same
hour. Therefore, microgrid 1 purchases energy from microgrid
3 in hour 7. Microgrid 2 and microgrid 3 purchase energy
during hours 1-10 and 23-24, because they lack local wind
generations during the corresponding time slots.
B. Optimal Power Scheduling
Through energy trading, the overall multi-microgrid system
purchases less power from the main grid, hence improves
the overall utilization of local renewable energy. We compare
the main grid power schedules with and without energy
trading, as depicted in Fig. 5. Note that even without energy
trading among microgrids, we always allow microgrids to sell
excessive renewable energy to the main grid. We see that
microgrid 2 purchases less power from main grid with energy
trading, because they can get power supply from microgrid 1
and microgrid 3. Microgrid 1 and microgrid 3 also sell less
power to the main grid with energy trading, because they sell
more local wind power to microgrid 2.
Fig. 6 depicts the optimal demand response of microgrids
1, 2 and 3 in the scenario with energy trading. We see that
microgrid 1 has peak power load at night time (hours 18-
22), and original power loads in microgrid 2 and microgrid
3 achieve peak levels at day time (hours 9-17). As shown in
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, the aggregate renewable power generation
has higher output during hours 1-10, and the electricity price
is higher in peak-time slots (hours 11-20). Therefore, all the
microgrids shift their flexible loads from peak-time slots to
off-peak time slots to use more renewable energy and reduce
their operational costs.
Fig. 7 shows the comparison of optimal energy storage
dynamics with and without energy trading, for microgrids 1,
2 and 3, respectively. We see that at the beginning of the day,
all microgrids charge more power into energy storage in the
scenario with energy trading than without energy trading. This
is because microgrids can trade renewable power with other
microgrids, and thus store more energy in batteries to meet
their peak loads later.
C. Optimal Payment
Table I shows the operating costs of microgrids 1, 2 and 3
and their payments for energy trading. The total cost of the
interconnected microgrids is reduced by up to 13.2% from
1637.8 to 1422.4. We see that energy trading reduces the
operating costs of microgrids 2 and 3. The operating cost of
microgrid 1, however, increases. The reason is that microgrid 1
sells more wind power to other microgrids for profits, instead
of selling back to the main grid. Microgrid 2 pays 124.5 and
33.4 to microgrid 1 and microgrid 3. Considering the overall
impact of cost and payment, every microgrid benefits through
energy trading. For example, microgrid 1 reduces the cost from
243.8 (no trading) to cost plus payment 172.1 (with trading),
which corresponds to a 29.4% decrease. This demonstrates
the effectiveness of our proposed payment scheme, which
incentivizes microgrids to participate in the energy trading.
TABLE I: Costs and payments
Merits vs Microgrids 1 2 3 System
Cost (no trading) 243.8 607.0 787.0 1637.8
Cost (with trading) 296.5 377.4 748.6 1422.4
Payment (for trading) -124.5 157.8 -33.4 0.0
Cost + Payment (with trading) 172.1 535.2 715.2 1422.4
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the energy trading problem among
interconnected microgrids using Nash bargaining theory. We
first presented a model for a single microgrid that captures
key features of smart grid technologies. Then we designed
a bargaining-based energy trading market for interconnected
microgrids, and proposed a distributed solution method. Nu-
merical simulations based on realistic meteorological data
demonstrated the effectiveness of the energy trading mech-
anism. In our future work, we will consider the role of the
power grid operator in the energy trading of microgrids.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
For the microgrids in set M′, they have incentives to trade
energy with each other. For any group of microgrids who
trade energy with each other, we conclude that the aggregated
operational cost of the microgrids-group G decreases, i.e.,∑
i∈G
(
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i)− CNoni
)
< 0. There always
exists a feasible payment allocation {pii, i ∈ G}, such that
its performance improves in terms of cost reduction, i.e.,
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i) + Ce(pii) < C
Non
i .
As constraint (18) is guaranteed to be satisfied, we can
divide the decision variables of the Nash bargaining problem
NBP into two sets: the energy trading & power scheduling
variables {gi, qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i, ei, i ∈ M′} and trading pay-
ment variables {pii, i ∈M′}. We observe that these two sets
of variables are decoupled, thus we can solve Problem NBP
in a sequential manner.
Given the optimal energy trading & power scheduling
decisions {g∗i , q∗i ,x∗n, r∗c,i, r∗d,i, e∗i , i ∈ M′}, we can solve
the optimal trading payment decisions {pi∗i , i ∈M′} through
max
∏
i∈M′
[
CNoni −
(
COi (q
∗
i ,x
∗
n, r
∗
c,i, r
∗
d,i) + Ce(pii)
)]
subject to (16),
variables: {pii, i ∈M′},
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and obtain
Ce(pi
∗
i ) =C
Non
i − COi (q∗i ,x∗n, r∗c,i, r∗d,i)
−
∑
i∈M′
(
CNoni − COi (q∗i ,x∗n, r∗c,i, r∗d,i)
)
M ′
.
(27)
Substituting (27) into Problem NBP yields the optimal
objective:∑i∈M′
(
CNoni − COi (q∗i ,x∗n, r∗c,i, r∗d,i)
)
M ′
M
′
. (28)
From (28), we conclude that Problem NBP maxi-
mizes the social welfare of all microgrids in M′, i.e.,∑
i∈M′
(
CNoni − COi (q∗i ,x∗n, r∗c,i, r∗d,i)
)
. Since CNoni is given,
we prove that Problem NBP minimizes the social cost of all
microgrids in M′, i.e.,
∑
i∈M′
COi (q
∗
i ,x
∗
n, r
∗
c,i, r
∗
d,i).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
For microgrids in setM′, we have proved in Proposition 1
that Problem NBP minimizes the social cost of all microgrids
in M′. Therefore, we can solve Problem NBP in a sequential
manner. First, we solve the optimal energy trading & power
scheduling to minimize the social cost of microgrids in M′.
Second, we solve the optimal trading payment to maximize
the Nash product in NBP.
However, we do not know the setM′. Since a microgrid j ∈
M\M′ does not have incentives to trade energy, its optimal
energy trading decisions will be e∗j = 0, and its optimal cost
is the same as the benchmark cost CNonj . Therefore, we can
solve the cost minimization problem for the whole system
consisting of all the microgrids in set M, and determine the
set M′ in which microgrids trade energy.
Specifically, we have the following two steps to solve
Problem NBP. In the first step, we minimize the social cost
of the microgrids-system in Problem P1:
min
∑
i∈M
COi (qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i)
subject to (1)–(3), (5), (6), (8)–(11), (14), (15), and (17),
variables: {gi, qi,xn, rc,i, rd,i, ei, i ∈M}.
Solving P1 determines the optimal energy trading &
scheduling {g∗i , q∗i ,x∗n, r∗c,i, r∗d,i, e∗i } for each microgrid i ∈
M. Based on the optimal energy trading decisions, we deter-
mine the setM′ in the following. Specifically, setM′ is made
up of microgrids having nonzero energy trading vector e∗i . For
each of the remaining microgrids j ∈ M\M′, it has a zero
energy trading vector, i.e., e∗j = 0, and thus neither receives
nor makes payment, i.e., pi∗j = 0. Only those microgrids in
setM′ would bargain with each other to decide the associated
trading payments.
In the second step, we solve the optimal trading payment
for microgrids i ∈M′ in Problem P2:
max
∏
i∈M′
(
δ∗i − Ce(pii)
)
subject to (16) and (18),
variables: {pii, i ∈M′},
where δ∗i , CNoni −COi (q∗i ,x∗n, r∗c,i, r∗d,i). Solving P2 deter-
mines the optimal payments for those microgrids participating
in energy trading.
